The Double Sighted: Visibility, Identity, and Photographs on Facebook by Vigliotti, Jeanette C
UNF Digital Commons
UNF Graduate Theses and Dissertations Student Scholarship
2014
The Double Sighted: Visibility, Identity, and
Photographs on Facebook
Jeanette C. Vigliotti
University of North Florida
This Master's Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the
Student Scholarship at UNF Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in UNF Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an authorized
administrator of UNF Digital Commons. For more information, please
contact Digital Projects.
© 2014 All Rights Reserved
Suggested Citation
Vigliotti, Jeanette C., "The Double Sighted: Visibility, Identity, and Photographs on Facebook" (2014). UNF Graduate Theses and
Dissertations. 506.
https://digitalcommons.unf.edu/etd/506
 The Double Sighted: Visibility, Identity, and Photographs on Facebook 
 
 
by  
 
 
Jeanette C. Vigliotti 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted to the Department of English  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
Master of Arts in English  
  
 
 
UNIVERSITY OF NORTH FLORIDA  
COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES 
 
 
April, 2014  
 II 
 
 
 
 i 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 I am grateful to my thesis advisor Dr. Clark Lunberry for his insightful support and 
comments. I would also like to express my gratitude to my thesis reader Dr. Nicholas de Villiers 
for all his source recommendations and advice. Furthermore, I would like to thank Dr. Lisa Baird 
for introducing me to this topic as an undergraduate. Additionally, I would also like to thank Dr. 
Wayne Riggs for his mentorship throughout my graduate experience. I also appreciate the keen 
editing eyes of Stephanie Johnson and Haley Bach—you both provided the fresh perspective 
necessary to make my final edits. I also appreciate my friends Janette Duval, Haley Frank, 
Mollie Saunders, Justin Soto, and Vincent Sullivan for always looking at various drafts and half-
formed ideas. Finally, I would like to thank my family for their unwavering support. I could not 
have made it to this point without your patience and assistance.  
  
 ii 
Table of Contents 
CHAPTER 1 THE LOOKING GLASS: MYTHS OF THE SUBJECT ......................................... 1 
I. An Introduction............................................................................................................ 1 
II. Identity in a Society of Visibility ................................................................................ 4 
III. Authenticity and Its Discontents.................................................................................. 8 
IV. Structuring and Reclassifying: Machine Identity ...................................................... 10 
V. Digital Communities.................................................................................................. 14 
VI. The Mirror Gaze ........................................................................................................ 16 
CHAPTER 2  NARCISSUS AT THE POOL: MYTHS OF VISIBILITY ................................... 18 
VII. Narcissus Rising ........................................................................................................ 18 
VIII. The Circle: To Be is To Be Seen? ............................................................................. 20 
CHAPTER 3  TAGGED!: ON CAMERA MOBILITY, MEMORY, AND FACEBOOK 
PHOTOGRAPHS ......................................................................................................................... 24 
IX. Camera Mobility ........................................................................................................ 24 
X. The Mythology of the Self ......................................................................................... 29 
XI. Facebook Photographs as a System of Representation ............................................. 32 
XII. Facebook Photographs and Tourism ......................................................................... 34 
CHAPTER 4  WHAT ECHO SAID: ON FACEBOOK PHOTOS AND IMMORTALITY ....... 42 
XIII. Make Me Immortal with a Click ............................................................................... 42 
XIV. Between the Idea and the Reality .............................................................................. 45 
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................. 51 
VITA………………...………………………………………………………………………….. 55 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 CHAPTER 1 THE LOOKING GLASS: MYTHS OF THE SUBJECT 
 
“The truth at last. He is myself! I feel it 
I know my image now” 
—Ovid, Metamorphoses  
 
An Introduction 
A Facebook user constructs identity through the photographs associated with the user’s 
profile. The ability to control what information is present on a profile often leads to an 
indictment of the Facebook identity as curated, inauthentic, shallow, and narcissistic. 
Reactionary scholars, like Jean Twenge, who wrote Generation Me: Why Today’s Young 
Americans are More Confident, Assertive, Entitled, and More Miserable than Ever and The 
Narcissist Epidemic: Living in the Age of Entitlement, often fixate on the medium of identity 
construction. By focusing solely on the alleged debilitating side effects of identity and selfhood 
in the age of social media, Twenge and other scholars become technological determinists, who 
promote a nostalgic myth of a cohesive, stable, and authentic identity that never existed. 
Additionally, according to Leo Marx and Merritt Roe Smith in Does Technology Drive History?: 
The Dilemma of Technological Determinism, technological determinists believe “the efficacy of 
technology [is] as a driving force of history” (x) and “that the social consequences of our 
technical ingenuity are…irreversible” (xi). Marx suggests in his chapter “The Idea of 
‘Technology’ and Postmodern Pessimism” that the presence of technological determinism in the 
mythos of American culture emanates from the technologically induced disasters of the twentieth 
century, particularly those anxieties emerging post-Hiroshima. This loss of faith in progress 
 3 
resulted in technological pessimism, which “refers to that sense of disappointment, anxiety, even 
menace, that the idea of technology arouses” (238). Many new media analyses subscribe to this 
technologically pessimistic vantage point and the “popular narrative” that deems technology as 
the supreme shaping force of society (X).
1
 The perpetual preoccupation with the newness of the 
medium obscures other issues of identity. Moreover, I will argue that the fixation on newness of 
the medium and its allegedly narcissistic users should be interrogated as a smokescreen, a way of 
not confronting two larger, interconnected issues: the acknowledgement that all identity is a 
construction, and reflects a desire for immortality. 
The echo effect of social media in dominant modes of discourse is dissonant, littered with 
voices of technological determinism. Those born after 1980 are generally identified as the 
Millennial generation. Millennials are admonished for their preference for onscreen 
communication. Twenge suggests that Millennials prefer to focus on themselves in isolation, and 
that the advent of social networking sites, like Facebook, allow for complete self-absorption. 
Twenge coined the term “Generation Me” to discuss the social habits of the Millennials. 
However, the tendency to label an entire generation as narcissistic inhibits any fair analysis of 
the current communication culture. Scholarship that analyzes rather than demonizes Facebook is 
necessary to assess the ways in which Facebook identity is produced. One way to achieve this 
balanced analysis is to refer to the Millennials not as members of “Generation Me” but as 
“digital natives.” Of these same Millennials, Marc Prensky wites in “Digital Natives, Digital 
Immigrants” that the Millennials “are all ‘native speakers’ of the digital language of computers, 
video games, and the Internet” (4).  This switch from “Generation Me” to “digital natives” 
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 See Nicholas Carr’s The Shallows: What the Internet is Doing to Our Brain for an in-depth 
exploration of technological pessimism in the Digital Age 
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acknowledges the Millennial’s preference for onscreen communication without demonizing such 
actions. 
Many scholars and theorists have already remarked on the ways in which social 
networking is changing the dynamics of human interaction: certainly, the last twenty years are a 
testament to the naturalization and domestication of the digital frontier through the physical 
presence of computers, laptops, tablets, cameras, and cell phones. The very idea of a 
“homepage” suggests that the spatial concept of home can translate into the intangible world of 
the digital. If such an intimate space is no longer confined to a physical location, it appears 
identity may no longer be confined to the physical body. Since the concept of identity in the 
digital age is already expansive, I will only speculate and theorize about Facebook identity 
construction with a concentration on the role of photographs within this specified social network. 
However, the role of cell phones, tablets, and other camera devices are also relevant to this 
discussion.   
Facebook user photographs have a particular function in identity construction that is 
similar to the language of self-reflection and self-description. By combining theories of 
photography, postmodernism, technology, and visibility, I will displace the fixation on the 
newness of the medium in order to fully explore the implications of identity on Facebook. I will 
flesh out the components of Facebook identity— an identity I feel is best described as a 
photographic diary of daily life.  
In order to properly discuss the presence of Facebook identity construction, I draw from 
Jacques Lacan’s notion of a split subject, Jacques Derrida’s concept of iterability in “Signature 
Event Context” and Barthes’ assessment of authenticity in “Deliberation” to demonstrate the 
constructed nature of identity. I expand and revise Susan Sontag’s On Photography and Barthes’ 
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musings about analog photography in Camera Lucida and “The Rhetoric of the Image” to 
understand how photographs function on Facebook. Furthermore, I consider the studies of Sherry 
Turkle and Michel Foucault’s “Panopticism” in order to illuminate the operating rules of 
Facebook. 
Identity in a Society of Visibility 
 I intend to trace the ways in which Facebook users enact panoptic impulses in order to 
produce the self within the social network. Through photographs, users form and constitute 
themselves in response to external performative functions. In order to understand the function of 
Facebook photographs we must first discuss the formation of the subject and the subject’s 
relationship to visibility. 
In Michel Foucault’s Discipline and Punish, he discusses the theory of panopticism; in 
examining Bentham’s Panopticon, Foucault theorizes about the power the external gaze has over 
an individual. The anxiety of constant visibility “arrests or regulates movement” and causes the 
subject of the gaze to perform in normative ways (11). The observed becomes “the object of 
information, never a subject in communication” because the individual is created through an 
external pressure (3). For Foucault, the external pressure was the “exercise of power [that] may 
be supervised by society as a whole” (6). Society projects standards and rules onto the individual 
through panopticism causing those under observation to normalize their actions. In effect, this 
external gaze causes an individual to pose; therefore rendering such action inauthentic. As we 
move on, the issue of posturing will become important to our analysis. 
 For panopticism to survive in culture and “remain invisible,” the subject internalized the 
normalizing gaze of constant visibility (9). This internalizing move is precisely why “[o]ur 
society is one not of spectacle but surveillance” (10). Here Jacques Lacan adds to the importance 
of visibility in the construction of the self. We can use Lacan to understand how we internalized 
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the external gaze of surveillance in our methods of self-presentation. Moreover, we can view the 
ways in which the method of internalized surveillance manifests in Facebook identity 
presentation. 
According to Nichols Mirzoeff in “The Subject of Visual Culture,” Lacan “turned this 
surveillance into self-surveillance, making each visual subject the locus of the panoptic drama of 
identity” (11). This external formation of identity is essential to Lacan’s exploration of the self. 
In The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance, Bruce Fink indicates “that the 
subject is never more than an assumption on our part,” which is to say, the subject, or ‘I’, is 
constituted through visibility, through outside observation (35). The word “observation” in this 
concept is deliberate—it recalls Jonathan Crary’s sentiments in Techniques of the Observer: On 
Vision and Modernity in the Nineteenth Century: “observare means to ‘conform one’s action to 
comply with; as in observing rules, codes, regularities, and practices’” (5-6). The self in a society 
of surveillance is the product of the “new mantra of visual subjectivity: ‘I am seen and I see that 
I am seen’” (Mirzoeff 10).  
But how do we negotiate this dualism of seeing and being seen? How does the experience 
of visibility effect the construction of the self? One of the ways to address these concerns is 
through Lacan’s theories on the split subject. While Foucault establishes that visibility 
transforms the subject into an “object of information,” Lacan demonstrates how the process of 
early childhood identification enacts this dichotomy of subject-as-object, or the self-as-other 
(Foucault 3). The experience of the self-as-object is revealed through Facebook identity 
construction because the nature of the Facebook profile occupies the spatial position of a mirror; 
alternatively, the self is constructed through exterior images. It is this third person gaze that 
occupies the contemporary concept of the self.   
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In Lacanian theory, the ego is externally formed through “a crystallization or 
sedimentation of ideal images” (Fink 36). A child “sees him or herself in a mirror” and the 
parental units identify the reflection, “insisting to their infant that the image in the mirror is him 
or her” (Fink 36). This is significant because the child’s first experience with the idea of the self 
is one that is given by an external authoritative entity, through observation. The sense of self, or: 
the ego, is constructed through the act of linguistic identification and is thereby alienating. The 
parental external identification of the infant addresses the Lacanian notion of the Symbolic 
Order. For Lacan, the Symbolic Order is concerned with the implementation of language, and by 
extension, the rules and regulations of society. This external identification “brings about the 
internalization of mirror and other images (e.g., photographic images), for [the infant’s] primary 
due to the parents’ reaction to such an image” (Fink 36). More importantly, this initial concept of 
the self belongs to the parents, not the infant. This causes a fracture in the cohesive nature of the 
subject, causing infants to “experience themselves as an object which is seen” and identified 
through language (Lee 1).  
 Lacan suggests that language is responsible for the split subject. Because language is 
“tangentially or asymptomatically our own,” an individual is forced to view the self as other 
(Fink 13). Fink offers that the “splitting of the I into the ego (false sense) and the unconscious 
brings into a being a surface, in essence, with two sides: one that is exposed and one that is 
hidden” (45). Lacan attributes the splitting of the subject as a function of language, which causes 
an individual to experience and observe the self as Other. If language performs this split and 
causes the self to experience a “double sense of seeing and being seen” (Mirzoeff 11) then the 
photographic language of Facebook only calls attention to the “uneasiness which seizes me when 
I look at ‘myself’ on a piece of paper” (Barthes Camera Lucida 13). 
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If, as Foucault suggests, discourse produces the subject and our present society is one of 
surveillance, then observation, as in one’s newsfeed, is the key factor in contemporary identity. 
The dichotomy of seeing and being seen turns the self into a split subject, an “object of 
information” that is rendered consumable by society (Foucault 3). We are the product of societal 
projections and expectations. We believe them to be part of our “authentic” experience as 
individuals and so we project these identities outward. We, as split subjects, consume these 
external pressures, a process Sandy Stone identifies as “warranting” (399).  In “Split Subjects, 
Not Atoms; Or How I Fell in Love with My Prosthesis,” Stones says warranting is “the 
production and maintenance of this link between a discursive space and physical space” (399).  
On Facebook, these projections become data to be consumed by societal interactions; we 
become lists of our likes and dislikes and a list of marketable ads. The constant reporting of daily 
living affirms the normalcy of the Facebook user. They report the image via text or Facebook—
this reporting externally validates the photographer’s subjectivity through image-consumption 
and image-production. 
Our status as visual subjects requires the double-sighted nature of seeing and being seen, 
a process that is literalized on Facebook. Twenge and Campbell classify the desire to post 
photographs on social networking sites as a cry for attention for the narcissist. However, by 
relegating this action narcissistic, the nature of visual subjectivity is left out. The culmination of 
Foucault’s internalized panopticism and Lacan’s split subject yields the visual subject. On 
Facebook, users invoke their visual subjectivity by posting and viewing photographs and posts.  
Warranting is useful in describing the formation of the visual subject; it accounts for the 
ways in which meaning is “ascribed to the physical body, is produced by means of inscription, 
such as legal, medical, and psychological texts” (Stone 399). Stone suggests that the subject is a 
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“legible body,” meaning the subject is read by observers for the “social meaning of ‘body’ 
inscribed on its surface, presenting a set of cultural codes that organize the way of the body is 
understood and determine a range of socially appropriate responses” (399). Here, we witness 
how the subject is produced through panopticism, through the state of observation, and the 
weight of societal pressure. Modernity developed the visual subject, and it is the digital age that 
exposes this level of construction. It is the revelation of identity scaffolding that is most likely 
the real cause of anxiety about the Facebook identity, though this fear is displaced and made to 
seem like a new issue when Facebook users post photographs to their profile.  
 
Authenticity and Its Discontents 
 Photographs are the literalization of the Lacanian split subject. Here, we are forced to 
experience “the advent of myself as other: a cunning dissociation of consciousness from 
identity” (Barthes Camera Lucida 12). By looking at the photograph, we become like Lacan’s 
infant in the mirror stage. We identify through the sensation of becoming an object, of 
experiencing ourselves through “dissociation.” What happens in front of the camera is a panoptic 
impulse for we change our bodies into a conventional, normalized form:  “I constitute myself in 
the process of ‘posing,’ I instantaneously make another body for myself, I transform in advance 
into an image” (Barthes, Camera Lucida 10). Read without attention to detail, Barthes’ 
observation could suggest that photography is responsible for the lack of authenticity in identity 
presentation, a problem exacerbated by a Facebook user’s shameless selfie.  However, 
panopticism reveals that posing is a product of surveillance society.  
 The gaze also causes inauthenticity in the space of the journal, a genre traditionally 
imbued with authenticity. Journals and diaries are private accounts of the self; their construction 
is kept away from public eyes and consumption. Barthes problematizes the notion of the Journal 
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as authentic in his essay “Deliberation.” Barthes offers that “the Other, caught up in a dual and 
somehow personal relation is anyone who will read me. In short, I imagine that my Journal pages 
are put in front of ‘whom I am looking at,’” suggesting that the potentiality of an audience 
corrupts any potential for a piece of writing that is sincere and not posed (491). Barthes indicates 
that “I am disgusted and irritated to find a ‘pose’ I certainly hadn’t intended” (479).  
This “irritation” with the pose demonstrates the internalization of surveillance. Even in 
the privacy of the journal, we find that authenticity is impossible. Facebook’s journalistic format 
allows us to align the traditional private journal with the social media confessional. The pose on 
social media is whatever the user choses to present—as long as that identity can conform to 
certain social pressures. The edited nature of the Facebook self is the effect of internalized 
surveillance. The ‘pose’ Barthes speaks of is the effect of the internalized panoptic gaze that 
operates with near invisibility in society, only to be revealed by those interrogating the structures 
of power and society. When Barthes poses in his journal, he performs a citation of identity. Of 
this occurrence, Mary Bittner Wiseman offers “there is no original: desire lived and written alike 
are simulacra of the already written” (The Ecstasies of Roland Barthes 121). The Journal and the 
Photograph become inauthentic markers of identity because both are inauthentic, simulated. 
Users of Facebook also perform a citation of identity, relying on past conventions and tropes to 
present themselves to the public gaze. 
Barthes further explores the nature of the pose in the Journal: 
I mean that its very form can only be borrowed from an antecedent…Writing in 
my Journal, I am, by status, doomed to simulation. A double simulation, in fact: 
for every emotion being a copy of the same emotion one has read somewhere.  
(493) 
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The idea of language “borrowed from an antecedent” aligns with Derrida’s concept of iterability. 
In “Signature Event Context,” Derrida explains indicates that both speech and writing are 
performative acts and are all iterable, citable, and repeatable. Derrida’s idea of iterability 
reinforces Barthes’ sentiments on authenticity in “Deliberation.” Our way of understanding and 
being part of the world is through language, and language is always already not ours, a construct 
that forces us to become alienated from our identities. This occurrence is embedded in the very 
idea of the Lacanian subject. Language mediates the subject and the idea of the self and this 
occurs online, as well as in physical life. 
When reduced to its most base form, social media is just another system of 
representation, one not wholly different than language itself. The mediation of reality often 
occurs through language, calling into question the nature of human interactions as an artificial 
construct.  In What is Posthumanism? Cary Wolfe offers that “the human is itself a prosthetic 
being, who from day one is constituted as human by its coevolution with and conconstitution by 
external archival technologies of various technologies of various kinds—including language 
itself as the first archive and prosthesis” (295). With Wolfe’s Derridean supposition, it becomes 
clear that communication is a construct humanity naively believes is completely natural. A 
degree of artificiality attends to all forms of communication, not just social media. Digital and 
physical communications are yoked together through the prosthesis of language and through the 
commonality of construction. In recognizing the constructed nature of language, even spoken 
language, we recognize the constructed nature of both digital or physical society and identity.  
 
Structuring and Reclassifying: Machine Identity 
In Life on the Screen, Sherry Turkle claims that the computer itself no longer has a “clear 
intellectual identity as a calculating machine” (18). If over the last twenty years the identity of 
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the computer-medium is fluctuating, is it really any wonder that the concept of human identity is 
in a similar process of revision, refusing to stabilize? Turkle argues that digital communities 
“allow people to generate experiences, relationships, identities, and living spaces”—social media 
has internalized the logic of older virtual communities and created a cultural phenomenon of a 
relentless need to certify the offline self through online activity (21). Turkle’s pioneering work 
on identity and the Internet can be used in conjunction with Barthes’ and Sontag’s theoretical 
meditations on the role of the camera.  
Reality is always already an interpretive experience, one mediated largely by the seeming 
invisible aspects of sociohistorical circumstances and largely through language. To pretend that 
reality is not mediated is to subscribe to a fiction, a nostalgic myth. However, it appears that 
social media sites like Facebook enjoy and exacerbate that mediation. Perhaps, it is best stated 
that the physical/traditional way on interpreting reality relies on the mediation of oral language 
whereas reality is interpreted online through the mediation of images. The nature of social 
networking excels and propels this peculiar form of mediation. 
As a practice, social networking revels in mediation, calling attention to immediate 
nostalgia.  According to Fredric Jameson in “Postmodernism and Consumer Society,” the 
immediate nostalgia produced by Facebook is actually a symptom of postmodernism. Jameson 
indicates that society has lost “its capacity to retain its own past, [and] has begun to live in a 
perpetual present” that functions through “media exhaustion” (11). In “You Can Tell Everybody 
This is Your Song,” Carrie Brownstein indicates that social media sites like Facebook have 
created a funeral for the present: “I think Facebook should advertise itself as a memorial service 
for the living. It makes the present feel as if it is instantaneously collecting dust” (2). 
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Brownstein’s present that collects dust mirrors Jameson’s media exhaustion of the perpetual 
present. 
 We can see evidence of this perpetual present on Facebook through the function of the 
newsfeed.  Turkle claims that “[o]ne way to describe what has happened is to say that we are 
moving from a modernist culture of calculation toward a postmodernist culture of simulation” 
(20). This simulation involves the onscreen experience in which texts and images are constructed 
and interpreted by the user because Facebook appears as a manifestation of personhood, of 
personal identity, and relationships. Here once again, we find that the subject is produced 
through outside observation. The photographs on Facebook reinforce simulated experience.  
Turkle diagnoses this process of simulation, claiming contemporary society is “moving 
toward a culture of simulation in which people are increasingly comfortable with substituting 
representations of reality for the real” (23). However accurate this claim feels, Turkle’s analysis 
is incomplete: this idea of substitution applies less to the Millennials and their children than it 
does previous generations. In digital native society, there seems little need or desire to mitigate 
the realness of the life online. Moreover, for digital natives, the presence of the camera is natural, 
ordinary, and expected.  In fact, online life is equally important as physical life. To classify 
physical life as “real” life assumes there is an unreal quality of a digital presence. For digital 
natives, this diminishment of the virtual feels largely untrue. To call the idea of living online as 
well as in the actual “simulation” still implies falseness, a copy, a shadow; yet, there is no other 
word to use for the process of dwelling simultaneously in the digital and actual worlds. I 
unwillingly use the term simulation, acknowledging the word cannot perform that task it needs 
to, knowing the proper word has not yet arrived.  
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For digital natives on Facebook, the authorial camera is hyperpresent. The camera is 
positioned as authorial for a couple of reasons. Firstly, when photographs are disseminated and 
shared, they appear to grant authority to an event because they are reproductions of reality. 
Secondly, the images produced by the camera act as the narrative “I” of identity, determining 
what the viewer (formally reader) sees and knows. Arguably, notions of Facebook reality as a 
counterfeit reality seem to wane for digital natives because they have internalized the notion of 
surveillance as posited by D.A. Miller in The Novel and the Police.  Miller provides some of the 
theoretical framework for identity in Facebook. The camera (through the pictures it produces) 
acts as the authorial voice, the true narrator of a (self)policed experience. The pictures 
authenticate the characterized version of the self on Facebook. Miller posits, “omniscient 
narration assumes a fully panoptic view of the world it places under surveillance. Nothing worth 
knowing escapes its notation, and its complete knowledge includes the knowledge that is always 
right” (23). If he is correct, then a Facebook user internalizes the omniscient narrator’s “complete 
knowledge” through the consumption of the photograph. 
Because the camera-narrator is normalized into the societal experience presented through 
the filter of a camera, and then through the filter of a social media site, it fails to seem strange, 
fails to shock. The naturalization of cameras in mundane life is what helps keep a site like 
Facebook from seeming intrusive. When the digital camera leapt from the stand-alone device to 
part of cell or smartphone, the total normalization of this authorial gaze, this certifying stamp, 
took hold.  
The case could be made that these authorial photographs function, replicate, and 
reproduce the way an individual would recount an event to a group of friends. Yet, any social 
situation involves the suppression of “undesirable traits.” After all, it is hardly polite 
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conversation or beneficial to the individual to casually and candidly enumerate such 
shortcomings in normal, physical conversation. The physical identity is just as constructed as the 
alleged narcissistic digital identity on social media. Admitting that the physical self is just a 
construction unsettles the fictive myth of physical supremacy. In “Signature Event Context,” 
Derrida indicates “one writes…to communicate to those who are absent” and it is absence that 
has traditionally associated writing with death (5). Speech is associated with the generative 
power of presence and of life, which is why speech is awarded primacy. The myth of physical 
supremacy is nothing more than the restaging of an ancient debate, traceable to Plato’s 
Phaedrus: the binary of the physical/digital is actually a generational descendent of the binary of 
speech/writing. The process of writing still stands, in the same subjugated position as the digital. 
Social media is threatening because it allows for an absent kind of communication, a spectral 
communication. 
Yet, construction of the physical or digital construction of the self is always a 
construction imposed by society. Rather than relegating social media as a tool of narcissism, it is 
important to contemplate the ways online identity is generative and imagined through the power 
constructs of online communities. The photograph is a stand-in for the verbal story. The picture, 
in short, produces a reality not dissimilar to the one produced in conversation. Truly, the 
difference in the conversation lies only in the medium, not in conversational content. 
 
Digital Communities  
 In CyberReader, Victor Vitanza indicates cyberspace “was coined and popularized by 
William Gibson in his novel Neuromancer. For Gibson, it means ‘consensual hallucination’” 
(Vitanza 1). Gibson’s explanation of cyberspace in Neuromancer parallels Benedict Anderson’s 
imagined communities. Gibson explains cyberspace, or more broadly, the Internet, is a 
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“consensual hallucination experienced daily by billions of legitimate operators, in every nation, 
by children being taught mathematical concepts... a graphic representation of data abstracted 
from the banks of every computer in the human system. Unthinkable complexity.” (67). If digital 
communities, like Facebook, operate in cyberspace then their users partake in the consensual 
hallucination. Facebook and other digital communities thusly represent postmodern 
reconfigurations of the imagined community of the nation state.  
Physical and digital communities share a great deal in common.  In Imagined 
Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism, Anderson explains the 
theoretical framework that creates the idea of the nation. He offers a nation “is an imagined 
political community” (6). He indicates the nation “is imagined because most of the members of 
even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them or even hear 
of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion” (6).  The fact that the 
majority of nation members “will never know most of their fellow-members” in physical life 
does not trivialize the bond. This same imagining—this consensual hallucination—is typically 
rendered as shallow despite the fact that “virtual communities ranging from MUDs to computer 
bulletin boards allow people to generate experiences, relationships, identities and living spaces 
that arise only through an interaction with technology” (Turkle 21). Both national communities 
and digital communities function on the principles proposed by Anderson. The only difference is 
one interaction occurs on the physical plane, while the other on a digital. The digitally imagined 
community, perhaps, is more direct in acknowledging the constructed nature of a community. 
Domingo Sanchez-Mesa Martinez explains the fluidity between Gibson’s consensual 
hallucination and Anderson’s imagined community in his article “Dialogical Thinking in the 
Digital Era: Paradoxes of Cyberculture.” Martinez offers the following about online communities 
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and Anderson: “what really distinguishes certain communities from others is the way 
identification links work in the minds of people, the way they imagine the community to which 
they belong” (110). Martinez establishes a link between Anderson and Gibson in such a way that 
demonstrates the capacity to rescue social media communications from becoming as meaningless 
and self-absorbed as Twenge and others suggest.  
At times, scholars conflate the terms “virtual reality” and “cyberspace.” Each term has its 
own nuance: Vitanza suggests that the “easy difference between cyberspace and virtual reality is 
that in VR [virtual reality], we can actually believe we are in it” (italics in original, 2). 
Throughout this work, I have carefully avoided the word “virtual reality”; the term virtual 
operates under a binary construct that always favors physical reality, a construct that positions 
the virtual as a “sham” (Vitanza 3). Instead, I find that digital reality is a far more appropriate 
signifier for the space of Facebook. On Facebook, users are actually in digital reality—to digital 
natives, it is no less real than physical reality. Digital reality then becomes the space in which 
Facebook functions because of the etymological roots of the term “digital”. Wolfe acknowledges 
the very term “digital” allows a degree of permeability between the online and the physical 
world. Wolfe indicates that digital “refers to electronically mediated mass culture based on 
binary coding…[and] harkens back etymologically to the digits, the fingers” (italics in original 
202). This etymological link between the online world and the physical world is central to 
acknowledging “we have not reality but realities” (Vitanza 3). These “realities” are accessed 
through language. The visual subject of Facebook experiences the social network from a state of 
multiplicity. 
The Mirror Gaze 
 For the digital natives, the myth of Narcissus is quite relevant. However, Narcissus’ 
relevancy is not for vanity and self-absorption, but for what Narcissus can teach us about visual 
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subjectivity and Lacan’s space of the screen. Phil Lee suggests, in his “Annotation to ‘The Split 
Between the Eye and the Gaze,’” that the 
gaze alienates subjects from themselves by causing the subject to identify 
with itself as the objet a, the object of the drives…in constructing the 
human subject…the gaze denies the subject its full subjectivity. The 
subject is reduced to an object of desire and, in identifying with this 
object, it becomes alienated from itself. (1) 
Like Narcissus, Facebook users identify with a reflection, only they are identifying through a 
photographic image. This identification is Lacan’s split subject, for the user’s gaze (much like 
Narcissus’ gaze) causes the subject to become an object. We can find traces of the photographic 
self as Other and object in Barthes’ Camera Lucida. The Lacanian space of the screen also 
parallels with Stone’s notion of warranting, because the self becomes “legible” through the 
alienated self-gaze and society’s panopticism. Lee also suggests that “Lacan’s scopic field as 
imagery space is one of the primary resources to investigate how our subjectivity is mediated by 
the images appearing on screens” (1). This mediation of subjectivity through photographs is what 
we will explore in the next few chapters because the imagined community of Facebook operates 
on these theories of vision in order to construct an identity. 
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CHAPTER 2  NARCISSUS AT THE POOL: MYTHS OF VISIBILITY 
 
“What determines me, at the most profound level, in the visible, is the gaze that is 
outside” 
—Jacques Lacan, “What is a Picture?” 
 
Narcissus Rising 
 Twenge and Campbell claim in The Narcissus Epidemic: Living in the Age of Entitlement 
that social media sites like Facebook force us to repeat “the tragedy of the mythical Greek 
Narcissus: we are hopelessly absorbed with ourselves” (105). For Twenge and Campbell, 
photographs play an essential role: social networking sites “reward the skills of the narcissist, 
such as self-promotion [by] selecting flattering photographs of oneself” (110). While this 
observation is accurate because Facebook allows for a selective presentation of the self, Twenge 
and Campbell are indulging a myth of identity—that there was some golden age of identity 
where people authentically presented every aspect of their selves for the public gaze and public 
consumption. However, as demonstrated previously by Barthes’ “Deliberation” essay, an 
authentic presentation of identity is not possible. Moreover, because contemporary society has 
internalized surveillance, (self)policed presentation is a common occurrence.  
 Twenge and Campbell claim the “name ‘Facebook’ is just right, with its nuance of seeing 
and being seen, preferably looking as attractive as possible” (107). While I disagree that 
Facebook is responsible for inducing cultural narcissism amongst Millennials, I acknowledge 
that Facebook does call attraction to the constitution of the visual subject through the “nuance of 
seeing and being seen” (107). Twenge and Campbell have that aspect of Facebook correct, 
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though rather than attributing this nuance to its panoptic root, they displace and demonize the 
nuance as a narcissistic trait. 
 A society of internalized surveillance troubles the idea of privacy and authenticity due to 
the idea of the gaze. Barthes noted that photography’s cultural emergence was synonymous with 
the “creation of a new social value, which is the publicity of the private” (Camera Lucida 98).  
Facebook uses the “publicity of the private” as an inherent operating principal. Photographic 
identity on Facebook originates from physical experience, though this form of identity does not 
reach maturation until its mediation online, in the public gaze. 
 We keep returning to the desire for visibility, for the “nuance of seeing and being seen” 
(Twenge and Campbell 107). Since the proliferation and popularization of Facebook, the rhetoric 
surrounding relationships reflects the position of authority Facebook occupies amongst the 
digital native population. Many digital natives say, “you’re not friends or in a relationship until 
it’s Facebook official.” According to Twenge and Campbell, this desire for publicity is the result 
of narcissism. However, we can better understand the desire to present the relationship in public 
as a panoptic impulse, one that positions the construction of the self as irrevocably intertwined 
with visibility.  
 In order to best understand the relationship between Facebook photographs and visual 
subjectivity, we can turn to Dave Egger’s novel The Circle. Though technologically pessimistic 
in nature, the novel is essential in our interrogation of Facebook identity. The Circle suggests a 
cultural interest and concern with the ramifications of digital native culture. Despite the presence 
of technological pessimism, the text is useful in illuminating the role visibility plays in the 
formation of social media identity.  
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The Circle: To Be is To Be Seen? 
In The Circle, Dave Eggers critiques social media culture by allegedly revealing the 
shallow nature of digital identity and digital communications. The story follows Mae Holland’s 
rise to power in the fictitious Facebook/Google-like social media company, The Circle. To 
eliminate confusion between the novel’s title and the fictitious company, the novel will be 
referred to as The Circle while the social media site will be referred to as The Circle. Employees 
of The Circle are known simply as Circlers, and are caricatures of Millennials worthy of a critic 
like Twenge. 
Eggers posits that the physical world always supersedes the digital world. This hierarchy, 
coupled with the trajectory of the novel, exposes Eggers’ subscription to technological 
determinism. Moreover, the novel is a panoptic attempt to police the behavior of the Millennials. 
By using the theoretical implications of Miller’s The Novel and the Police, I position the novel as 
a form of literary discipline because The Circle enforces normative practices of social 
communication predicated by the supremacy of the physical world. Online identity, according to 
the logic of The Circle, is validated externally by the pleasure divined from constantly being 
observed. This supposition guides the formation of identity on Facebook as well.   
The presence of the camera in the novel mimics the naturalization of the camera in the 
real world. On actual social media sites like Facebook, pictures assist in the creation of digital 
identity. Furthermore, in “The Scene of the Screen: Envisioning Cinematic and Electronic 
‘Presence’,” Vivian Sobchack indicates the “technological innovations” of realism brought 
“unprecedented visibility” particularly in the form of the photograph (90). In The Circle, 
visibility poses a central issue for the formation of identity, one tied to the presence of 
photographs with the social network. 
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This reliance on camera-confirmed visibility begins early in the novel. Fellow Circler 
Josiah admonishes Mae’s lack of photographic documentation, calling such behavior “selfish” 
(Eggers 187). He says, “I’m doing a search now of your name for visual documentation of any of 
these trips you’ve taken. I’m not finding anything… think if you’d been documenting. If you’d 
been using a tool that would help confirm the identity of whatever birds you saw, then anyone 
can benefit” (italics in original 186-7). At this point in the novel, Mae had failed to document her 
excursion; it was as if her experience did not exist because it lacked digital visibility.  
If Mae had documented her experience and posted it onto The Circle’s social network, 
her experience would have existed past the confines of mere memory. The camera that helped 
“confirm the identity” of the wildlife would simultaneously validate Mae’s experience as an 
individual. By taking photographs and sharing them on The Circle, Mae becomes a visual 
subject, recognizable by her visually documented activities. Without “visual documentation”, 
Mae’s selfhood is at stake (Eggers 187).  
 Eggers suggests that for digital natives, and for digital natives alone, to be seen is to 
exist. However, the nuance of being seen and seeing is older, locatable not only in Foucault, but 
also in the theories of eighteenth century philosopher George Berkeley. Essentially, Berkeley’s 
theory of immaterialism liberates the users of social media from a shallow desire of observation. 
Berkeley posits that for a subject to exist, the subject must be externally perceived. Sylvie 
Henning explains in “Film: A Dialogue Between Beckett and Berkeley” that only through the 
“act of being perceived” can a subject be “invested with sensible qualities, thereby coming into 
existence” (2). This further displaces the need for external validation to the 1700s, long before 
the rise of the digital age. 
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What is unique about digital native culture is that this kind of visibility is spectral—
meaning that the subject does not have to be physically observed in real time. Instead the subject 
is split, objectified by its’ photographic reflection and placed online for a digital audience. Once 
again, we can turn to Derrida and understand that the operating principles of a social media site 
like The Circle or Facebook are an absent form of communication, one related to writing. Social 
media differs from novels and poetry of past centuries because it democratizes the ability to 
make identity “iterable in our absence”(Derrida qtd in Wolfe 294). Moreover, this potential for 
iterability “is always already in play with any form of representation, any semiosis whether of 
word or image” (italics in original Wolfe 295). When we recognize the need for external 
observation is not new, we realize social media identity and experience are not vastly different 
from physical identity and experience.  
While Eggers does seem to suggest that only digital natives crave visibility, his 
observations concerning this existential crisis are worth noting. Eggers confronts the nature of 
the visual subject towards the end of the novel. By the end of the novel, Mae constantly streams 
a live video feed and consistently uploads pictures to the other members of the Circle. She has 
achieved transparency, the highest form of visibility. Mae interacts with Kalden, one of the 
inventors of the Circle, who believes the social network has too much societal information: 
[Mae]--I think everything and everyone should be seen. And to be seen, 
we need to be watched. The two go hand and hand.  
[Kalden]--But who wants to be watched all the time?  
[Mae]--I do. I want to be seen. I want proof I existed. ( italics in original 
Eggers 485) 
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When Mae says, “I think everything and everyone should be seen. And to be seen, we 
need to be watched. The two go hand and hand,” she acknowledges that the visual subject is the 
result of panoptcisim (485). We can stretch this statement further to its most theoretical point: as 
a construction of panopticism, the visual subject becomes a split subject, an object consumed by 
the public gaze. In a society of surveillance, this is the way people are given meaning: visibility. 
One way to certify this visibility is through pictures on social networking sites. 
Once again, readers are reminded that the goal of social media is to certify existence. The 
sensation of being seen and observed is the only way to come into existence. Such certification is 
what creates identity online. What Mae suggests is that without being “seen” she has no proof 
she existed at all. This reinforces Berkeley’s formulation of identity. Mae does not want to be 
forgotten, to fade away, to remain unseen, to not exist. Social media offers its users a certifying 
presence, an archival effect, a slice of immortality.  
We now return to Lacan’s split subject. When the split subject is forced to recognize 
itself from an exterior vantage point, the self becomes an object, Other. On social media sites 
like The Circle or Facebook, the object-self becomes validated in the process of 
commodification. In The Circle, commodification occurs through the amount of zings, smiles, 
followers, and comments on a user’s profile. These digital interactions are the currency of 
visibility, proof of existence.  On Facebook, commodification occurs through likes, comments, 
and shares. All of these online interactions are recognition of being seen. We explore the 
currency of visibility and self-commodification more fully in the last chapter, but for now we 
turn our attention to the Facebook experience and the photographs that populate the social 
network.  
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CHAPTER 3  TAGGED!: ON CAMERA MOBILITY, MEMORY AND 
FACEBOOK PHOTOGRAPHS 
 
“Photography is an element of a new and homogenous terrain of consumption and 
circulation in which an observer becomes lodged”  
—Jonathan Crary, Techniques of the Observer 
 
“Self-definition can be a determined appeal for recognition” 
—Denise Riley, The Words of Selves: Identification, Solidarity, Irony 
 
Camera Mobility 
 The advent of the extreme accessibility of the camera, located today not only as a stand-
alone device, but also included in digital tablets, phones, and computers, allows nearly all 
members of society to function as what Barthes terms Operator (the photographer), Spectator 
(the voyeur and consumer of photographs), and Spectrum (the subject/object of the photograph) 
in Camera Lucida. As mentioned, the constant availability of the camera nurtured an entire 
generation of amateur and professional photographers armed with pocket cameras, waiting to 
preserve reality with the click of a button. Barthes’ terms are our departure point for discussing 
photographs on Facebook, though these terms expand when applied to Facebook because 
Facebook users often occupy all of Barthes’ terms at the same time. Due to this simultaneous 
embodiment of the Operator, Spectator, and Spectrum, I will herein refer to this phenomenon as 
the Photographic Triad. Even in the Photographic Triad, we can trace the presence of 
panopticism. The gaze of the camera creates a situation that reveals to the Spectrum the nature of 
surveillance, which forces the “pose” that Barthes discusses in Camera Lucida and 
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“Deliberation.” When we pose for a camera, we “transform” ourselves into “an image in 
advance” (Camera Lucida 10); this transformation is a panoptic impulse because when we pose, 
we alter our presentation to fit within the appropriate societal bandwidth.  
 One of the ways we can explore the nature of photographic identity on Facebook emerges 
in two iPhone 5 television commercials from 2013. We will attend to both commercials 
separately. The first commercial, released directly from Apple, contains only one line of dialogue 
through the entire minute long commercial: “Every day, more and more photos are taken with 
the iPhone than any other camera” (Apple iPhone 5, Apple). The commercial features no 
celebrity cameos, no images or scenes of the social elite. Instead, the mundane world and the 
average person are elevated, capturing elements of what Susan Sontag would classify as 
“souvenirs of daily life” (On Photography 6).  The people in the commercial take photographs of 
scenery and each other, cataloging the minutia of living. The elevation of the “souvenirs of daily 
life” also reveals the internalization of surveillance. The focus of an ordinary person as 
photographer also demonstrates the cultural message of the advertisement: every experience and 
vantage point is not only valid, but relevant in social networks.  
We must pause on the cultural message that every vantage point is relevant. This speaks 
not only to an American understanding of the importance of the individual, but is also 
underscores the culture of pluralist capitalism—a cultural understanding that directly impacts the 
formation of a user’s identity on social media sites like Facebook. In The Spirit of Democratic 
Capitalism, Michael Novak indicates “[p]ersonhood entails the right—the vocation—to be 
different” (italics in original 64). This preset of pluralist capitalism is of particular interest to our 
discussion regarding photographic Facebook identity construction because the “vocation to be 
different” is also related to the commodification of identity. Personhood in this context becomes 
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a commodity because the photographs, like the ones taken in the iPhone commercial, are traded 
and exchanged on Facebook every day. The exchange of photographs allows for an exchange of 
varying perspectives, each image dutifully consumed by the Facebook user.  
The role of the everyman photographer in the commercial is important for another 
reason: the everyman photographer enacts the amorphous, postmodern space between amateur 
and professional. This blurred space between professional and amateur photographer is also 
symptomatic of postmodernity. Jameson indicates that one of the effects of postmodernism “is 
the effacement…of some key boundaries or separations, most notably the erosion of the older 
distinction between high culture and so-called mass or popular culture” (1). Smartphone 
technology facilitates the rise of the amateur photographer through the use of filters included in 
the camera feature of the smart phone. The iPhone 5 is not alone in this endeavor; Instagram, a 
mobile photo sharing app now owned by Facebook, features built in filters that boost the quality 
and appearance of a normal photograph. Facebook’s own photo uploader features similar camera 
filters. The filters recall Jameson’s perpetual present and Brownstein’s dust collecting future. By 
utilizing either the Instagram or Facebook filters, users may feel compelled to alter the original 
photograph with nostalgic colors.  
 As the focal point of the advertisement, the iPhone 5’s camera is placed in a variety of 
settings throughout the minute-long advertisement. Because the camera is featured in numerous 
geographic locations in the commercial, the presence of the camera within society is 
normalized—as is the action of the Operator. The advertisement features a variety of Operators 
that either slow down their pace or stop moving entirely to capture an image. The man presented 
between the 12
th
 and 15
th
 second mark best exhibits this. The man crouches slightly in a 
drenched street to photograph a weathered red building. After snapping the perfect, 
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immortalizing photograph, the man straightens and jogs away. Perhaps he is an excited tourist, a 
twenty-first century flaneur, departing for the next moment to collect and consume. The ad is 
unclear. In the end, it does not matter what prompts the man to slow, crouch, and depart quickly; 
what does matter is the fact that his behavior resonates with the Millennial audience, who has, 
more than likely, performed the same action or witnessed a similar occurrence. It is the 
photograph, after all, that will stand in as representation for the experience on Facebook. While 
there will be some textual certification in the form of a photo album name or a caption in the 
form of an explanatory sentence, it is the photographs that are collected that will narrate the 
event and the memory of the experience on social media. 
 The second commercial produced by Sprint espouses the goal of photographic narration 
within the context of current culture. We can use the Sprint commercial to explore how the 
emerging digital natives operate as the Photographic Triad. The commercial states: 
The miraculous is everywhere. In our homes. In our minds. We can share 
every second of data dressed as pixels. A billion roaming photojournalists 
uploading the human experience and it is spectacular. So why would you 
cap that? My iPhone 5 lets me see every point of view, every panorama: 
the entire gallery of humanity. I need to upload all of me. I need, no, I 
have the right to be unlimited. (Sprint) 
In essence, the narrator of the commercial is the digital everyman, the one espousing the values 
of visual subjectivity. Here, we can glance at the implications of a society that has internalized 
surveillance. When viewed microcosmically, the word “unlimited” refers to the size of the data 
plan. However, more macrocosmically, “unlimited” has potent implications for the visual subject 
of contemporary culture. 
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 The speaker of the Sprint commercial elevates the plight of the ordinary life to the status 
of the “miraculous.” The advertisement positions the iPhone 5 as authorial for it possesses the 
capacity to “see every point of view.” Here, the camera becomes the tool by which the “entire 
gallery of humanity” is unveiled. The desire to present and observe the “entire gallery of 
humanity” is also a panoptic impulse, one that resonates with the logic Josiah promoted in The 
Circle when he suggested Mae should document all of her experiences. 
It is also important that the use of the word “gallery” is present in the Sprint commercial, 
for it suggests and recalls a visual experience. The Sprint advertisement (much like The Circle) 
suggests that the “gallery of humanity” is observable through the photographs uploaded onto 
social networks. Through the “billion roaming photojournalists,” human experience and identity 
can be poetically “dressed as pixels.” The desire to dress human identity in pixels is a trope of 
sci-fi stories. While this rhetoric is certainly interesting, my end goal for this particular analysis 
does not allow for such musings. 
The phrase “roaming photojournalists” also denotes the postmodern erosion of amateur 
and professional photographers. The collapse of these categories also means that these “billion 
roaming photojournalists” can causally “uploa[d] the human experience” in the form of a 
photograph. And it is these “photojournalists” that reinforce the idea that the authorial camera 
lets “nothing worth notation…escap[e] its gaze” (Miller 23). 
While the entire commercial is provocative, the second to last line is the most gripping: “I 
need to upload all of me.” The simplest response to this statement is to ask why there is a “need” 
and not a “want.” The commercial demonstrates the digital native belief that the essence of 
humanity is a thing that can, and needs to be transported to the digital realm. This desire for 
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transference to the social network is the result of panopticism, the desire for visibility for, as we 
have begun to discover, visibility is vital in the constitution of the subject.  
 
The Mythology of the Self 
 The nature of the digital space of Facebook allows for users to construct a personal, 
visually narrated mythology. Facebook’s very name implicates its capacity and potential for 
narrative construction. It may seem problematic to claim that Facebook identity is equally valid 
as a physical presentation of identity; however, we have already discussed the ways in which an 
“authentic” identity is not realistic or possible. Both Facebook and physical identities rely on 
personal fictions to position the self as cohesive. The stabilizing effect of narrative is what holds 
the recognition of the Lacanian split subject at bay. It is this narrative effect that I want to 
explore. 
 The reproduction of reality inherent in photographs is the latest narrative tool employed 
to construct the myth of a cohesive identity. The narrative capacity of photographs intensifies 
when they are included as an autobiographical device on Facebook. Wiseman reminds us that 
autobiographies are “constructed, not natural. The autobiography is not a self-written life, but a 
rewritten self; for insofar as the self is constructed along lines drawn by the structural model of 
language, it may be said to be written” (Wiseman 112). Furthermore, Barthes suggests that 
photography “began, historically, as an art of the Person: of identity, civil status, of what we 
might call, in all senses of the term, the body’s formality” (italics in original Camera Lucida 27). 
Barthes acknowledges photography’s art form: identity construction. The photographic identity 
construction is a narrative, a story of a person. 
Because Facebook functions similar to an autobiography, I intend to explain how 
photographic narratives function. The desire to create and recreate narratives to communicate 
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experience is what I term the Calliope Impulse. Derived from the Greek muse of epic poetry, the 
Calliope Impulse is associated with the act of creation and the act of deposing older narratives so 
new stories may rise. The Calliope Impulse not only governs the physical world, but is also 
easily visible regarding photographic narrative structures present on Facebook.  
For Barthes, the analog photograph contained the “illogical conjunction between the 
here-now and the there-then” (italics in original “Rhetoric of the Image” 278). Once a 
photograph is uploaded to Facebook, the photograph experiences an additional postmodern 
temporality that I call the here-always, which is akin to Jameson’s notion of the “perpetual 
present” (“Postmodernism and Consumer Society” 11). This strange temporality affects the way 
in which the photographic Facebook narrative functions. Facebook users actively craft 
autobiographical accounts of their lives, cataloging experiences, snapping photographs. In 
essence, the Facebook status update box encourages users to offer "souvenirs of daily life" 
(Sontag 6). Facebook demands its users immortalize the mundane and the extraordinary for a 
(relatively) public audience.  
Profile and Cover photographs are two ways in which an individual user begins to use the 
Calliope Impulse to present an identity. The profile picture is similarly situated to the verbal 
language of self-description, a concept thoroughly explored in Denise Riley’s The Words of 
Selves: Identification, Solidarity, Irony. According to Riley, linguistic self-descriptors “may well 
be my self-fantasy. Perhaps each and every act of identification is fantastical…for fantasy is 
sustained through metaphorocity” (13). Riley suggests that self-descriptions are a way to narrate 
a projection of the self’s interiority. When applied to the photographic language of Facebook, the 
profile picture becomes an act of “self-fantasy” as well; the profile picture is a visual self-
description, the first introduction to the Facebook self. The profile picture is also an act of 
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metaphor because it is the double, the Lacanian object-self of the physical user. When members 
of Facebook look at another user’s profile picture, they are met with a photographic equivalent of 
a linguistic self-descriptor, a public representation of interiority equally as revelatory as 
revealing that one is “artsy” or “adventurous” The profile picture functions as “me as my 
enthusiasms” (Riley 23). Consequently, such enthusiasms are the guiding force of the banner-
like Cover photograph. In a way, the Cover photograph functions as a contemporary coat of 
arms, offering an additional means of self-description meant to display a user’s personality for 
digital consumption. 
Another way Facebook users engage the Calliope Impulse is through the increasingly 
blurred distinction between physical life events and digital ones. Recently, a new feature was 
introduced to Facebook’s design: the ability to designate milestone moments in the form of an 
“Add a Life Event” feature. These Life Events are photographically represented on Timeline. 
Now, a Facebook user has the narrative authority to mark various life events in a medium that 
feels like a publication. 
 In the 2013 incarnation of Facebook's status update box, users are prompted to share 
three options: Status, Photo, and Check In. These three options actively construct the identities of 
users and suggest the increasing legitimacy of the intangible frontier of the social network and 
the photographs that comprise the medium. In most basic terms, the Status option functions as a 
caption. When a user posts a status update, the text is placed next to the user’s profile picture. 
This configuration is visible not only on the user’s profile, but also in the streaming newsfeed.  
The “Check-in” option is the most suggestive. Though this feature was designed with 
Foursquare in mind, the ability to “check in” online demonstrated the panoptic nature of the 
social media user. By self-reporting the physical location to Facebook, we can begin to 
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understand how photographs are an extension of internalized surveillance and how this 
surveillance produces an identity. 
Facebook Photographs as a System of Representation 
At this moment in our discussion, I find it necessary to explain how photographs function 
as a part of a myth system on Facebook.  In “Myth Today,” Roland Barthes indicates that  
[p]ictures become a kind of writing as soon as they are meaningful…We 
shall therefore take language, discourse, speech, etc., to mean any 
significant unit or synthesis, whether verbal or visual: a photograph will be 
a kind of speech for us in the same way as a newspaper article. (3) 
What we can extrapolate from this supposition is that once a sign is charged with meaning, it 
becomes a form of speech. Facebook photographs are charged with the power of self-description. 
In this way, Facebook photographs help “conver[t] reality into speech,” and into a system of 
representation that we can begin to decode and understand (Barthes 2).  
In Chapter 1, I suggested that photographs visually depict the Lacanian split subject. The 
fracturing of the subject between self and other is a by-product of language. When applied to the 
photographic system of Facebook, the split subject also struggles to present and maintain the 
appearance of cohesive integrity. The desire for cohesion is part of a larger cultural mythic 
system. Facebook users utilize photographs to present aspects of the self for public consumption. 
We previously noted that the profile and cover photograph can be understood as an image of 
self-description. When used in this way, the language of Facebook photographs becomes a 
narrative tool to express the self to the world. The expression of interior reality is problematic 
though. In Speaking into the Air: A History of the Idea of Communication, John Durham Peters 
offers  
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Language and signs are crude carriers for the inner life. Words at best are 
conventions; they refer to meanings inside people’s minds and to objects 
in the world. When we express ourselves, we trust private self-stuff to 
public symbol proxies. (64) 
Spoken, written, and photographic language all furnish an individual with “public symbol 
proxies” that are meant to convey our unique experience. But, as Peters suggests, all of these 
systems of representations are “crude carriers” and “conventions” (64). Once again, we are 
reminded authenticity is impossible:  our language and posing interrupts our best attempts to 
resolve not only the split subject of self and other, but self and society. The impossible task of all 
communication, whether spoken or written, is the “reconcil[iation] of self and other” (Peters 9).  
On Facebook, this task is trivialized because photographs are the language of self-
description, but by remembering Derrida’s observations on iterability, we can rescue Facebook 
communication from triviality and narcissism. By recognizing that “[a]ll communication, 
whether face-to-face or distant” is “a problem of mediation,” we are made conscious of the way 
that language structures our experiences (Peters 64). Like Lacan suggests, language forces the 
subject to become other, to become an object. Yet, as we construct our identities on Facebook or 
in the physical world, language also creates an illusion of cohesion. One of the ways Facebook 
users engage the Calliope Impulse is by constructing a narrative of the self that to the observer 
appears stable. On Facebook, the photographic language of self-description aids a user in 
presenting a stable, fictional identity. For example, if I identify myself as an equestrian, I will 
likely reflect that passion on Facebook through my photographs and statuses. In the physical 
world, I would present this identity through recounting horse stories to my friends, or by wearing 
my breeches and boots unabashedly to dinner. On Facebook, I may post a picture of my horse in 
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the pasture; I might post a picture of myself on my horse sailing effortlessly over a jump. My 
photographic language asserts my posture as a strong, dedicated rider. However, these 
photographic self-descriptors of “The Equestrian” do not account or reveal my fragmentary 
experiences as an individual. My Facebook and physical identity may reflect a horse enthusiast, 
but this identity is carefully cultivated through what I choose to reveal and conceal through 
language. My language, photographic or oral, reveals my fictionalized perspective of my 
selfhood. 
 It is at this moment that we must return to Barthes’ observation of photography as “the 
art of a Person” (Camera Lucida 12). Barthes suggests an individual’s identity is chiefly a 
construction, artificially dressed and narratively developed. Perhaps what makes many 
technological pessimists most uncomfortable about the digital natives’ use of Facebook is the 
way in which the scaffolding of identity is rendered visible through language. 
Facebook Photographs and Tourism 
 I want to challenge Sontag’s claim that “the camera makes everyone a tourist in other 
people’s reality, and eventually in one’s own” (On Photography 57). Sontag claims that 
photography “has become one of the principle devices for experiencing something, for giving an 
appearance of participation” (10). Facebook’s Timeline feature certainly carries aspects of such 
photographic tourism; however, just because users are navigating other user’s photographs does 
not mean that users are merely giving an “appearance of participation.” 
  On Facebook, shared photographs allow for active participation in the (re)creation of 
memory. Because the Internet exists in the illogical postmodern temporality of the perpetual 
present of the here-always, there is an inevitable expansion of the term participation. When users 
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log onto Facebook, they are immediately brought to the live-stream of the newsfeed
2
. Often, 
photographs populate the newsfeed. When users click on another individual’s profile, they can 
tour various photographs and years. This ability to meander through the online events does not 
directly translate into a touristic non-participation as Sontag would suggest. A user’s capacity to 
encounter and re-encounter photographs is a digital form of participation because every view, 
like, and comment shapes not only the photograph, but also the experience of the user. 
Depending in the privacy setting of a user, photographs uploaded on Facebook belong to 
all the user’s friends on social network and not just the individual uploading the photograph. This 
shared experience and memory of the digital photograph becomes a postmodern form of public 
memory. As Annette Kuhn indicates in Family Secrets: Acts of Memory, Acts of Imagination, 
“memories evoked by a photo do not simply spring out of the image itself, but are generated in a 
network, an intertext, of discourses that shift between past and present, spectator and image” 
(14). With regards to Facebook, the ability for multiple users to view and engage any given 
photograph demonstrates how memory is generated in a network. The photograph’s capacity to 
generate a memory demonstrates the Calliope Impulse. Users seek to colonize the photograph, 
assign meaning to the image. It is this process of colonization that illuminates how experience 
and participation function on Facebook. 
Facebook offers its users a variety of ways to upload and present photographs to the 
social network. A person may either create an album or upload directly to Timeline. Either 
                                                             
2
 According to Facebook, the Top News feature is “ based on an algorithm” and “uses factors 
such as how many friends re commenting on a post to aggregate content you’ll find interesting” 
(Facebook Tips). Additionally, Facebook introduced Sponsored Stories that are paid 
advertisements that appear on the Top Newsfeed (Facebook Help). 
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option adds the photograph to the profile.  The Facebook photo album has antecedents in an 
older Calliope Impulse: the family photo album of the twentieth century.  
In order to discuss the family photo album, we must turn to Sontag. According to Sontag, 
coffee table photo albums of the twentieth century presented a “portrait chronicle…a portable kit 
of images that bears witness to its connectedness” of a family’s identity (Sontag, On 
Photography 8). Here, Sontag admits that “cameras go with family life” in order to construct 
mythologies of people (8). Bound up in the family photo album is the presentation of a 
constructed, cohesive, and stable familial identity. In other words, a family photo album creates a 
singular narrative or myth of the family, one that feels complete and truthful due to the 
photograph’s capacity to faithfully reproduce reality. Photographs authenticate an illusion of 
continuity, particularly when photographs are fastened chronologically in a family photo album. 
The selection and editing process of the family photo album operates under the same parameters 
as the selection and editing of narrative, on Facebook or elsewhere. By taking selected scenes, 
the photographic construction of the family photo album engages the Calliope Impulse in order 
to present a mythical cohesive familial identity. 
 If these earlier family photo albums were a “portable kit of images” aimed at creating a 
familial identity, then the Facebook photographs are the digital descendants of this older 
practice. After all, both the photo album and Facebook photographs operate under similar 
parameters of narrative identity construction. Facebook users also gather, select, and upload 
images in order to present a cohesive identity for the individual user. The abundance of images 
accessible on social media websites create a shift in identity construction that is ultimately 
grounded in Sontag’s notion of a “portable kit of images.” No longer are people limited to 
constructing ideas of individuality via portraits in a mundane photo album. In contemporary 
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digital culture, the sheer quantity of photographs aid in the creation of a visually represented self, 
or doppelganger, that may or may not contrast to the physical self.  
However, the experience of paging through a Twentieth century photo album is not 
perfectly replicated on Facebook. Firstly, unlike the family photo album, Facebook photo albums 
do not necessarily present linear time. Due to the temporality of the here-always of the Internet 
as well as the postmodern temporality of the perpetual present, Facebook photo albums are not 
bound to presenting chronologic experience. We will explore the melding of past and present in 
more detail a bit later. Secondly, Facebook profiles are concerned with the presentation of an 
individual’s identity and not necessarily concerned with the creation of familial identity. Thirdly, 
while the process of editing, revising, and constructing the album remains the same, Facebook 
photographs are not confined to mere tourism. Continuous conversations in the form of 
comments mean an image is constantly gaining and losing importance. The facial recognition 
software actively engages Facebook users. The social network’s algorithm has the ability to 
recognize an individual with fairly reliable accuracy. This technological recognition is not 
insignificant, nor should it be treated lightly. Recognition and naming are powerful acts. The 
software’s ability to identify individuals allows users to feel relevant, recognized, and 
remembered.   
By receiving recognition from the institution of Facebook, its users have momentary 
proof that their faces are etched into the metadata, undying and permanent. This certification and 
visibility in the digital community also signifies a panoptic impulse. This panoptic recognition 
helps us understand Mae from The Circle and her desire for proof of her existence. Because 
users are recognized through an algorithm, their physical representation is mathematically 
retained, stored for future reference and proof of the subject’s existence. We can also return to 
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Mae from The Circle in order to acknowledge that the identity is constructed through outside 
perception and recognition.  Riley also confirms this process: “the daily fact of societal 
description ‘from the outside’—how I’m reported by others, what’s expectantly in place, already 
chatting about me before I appear on stage—is integral to the dialectic of self-description” (7). 
This moment of outside recognition is a crucial part of the process of Facebook identity and is 
latently discoverable in the seemingly innocuous question posed by Facebook: “Do you want to 
tag so-and-so?”  
Whether the Facebook photograph is uploaded directly to Timeline or placed in a photo 
album, the initial moment of uploading signifies the initial memory of the physical event that has 
been selected for memorialization. The placement of the photograph is representative of some 
truth or value relevant to the subject. Moreover, the uploaded photograph is part of the panoptic 
impulse of visual subjectivity. 
This initial upload also allows the user to interact with the photograph by inscribing its 
significance through the art of captioning. The initial upload also allows other users to generate 
some sort of commentary about the uploader’s experience. The uploader, in turn, often interacts 
through the comment feed, participating in what can become an infinite dialog. While the 
photograph’s Spectrum may be sealed forever, the photograph’s digital reality is continuous, 
locked in a perpetual present. Once uploaded, a photograph becomes embedded in the lives of 
other Facebook users. The photograph becomes collective, shared, and lived through Barthes’ 
“new social value” of “the publicity of the private.” The digital interaction surrounding the 
photographic representation of reality becomes an event that happens in simulation, as suggested 
by Turkle—not in the physical world. While the Facebook user may pause physical life for the 
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sake of capturing moments, the user interacts with the photographic representation of a moment 
online. 
Meaning and memory are assigned to an individual’s personal narrative when the 
photograph is uploaded to the social network and placed in the public sphere. One of the ways to 
explain this strategy of meaning creation is through Walter Benjamin’s observations in “A Short 
History of Photography.” Benjamin indicates, “the future is nesting” in a photograph (202). On 
Facebook, the “future” importance and significance of a photograph is always “nesting” in the 
minds of the social network users. Because, as Kuhn states, memory is “a never ending process 
of making, remaking,” the meaning of the photograph is not particularly stable (19). As time 
progresses, a particular photograph may gain importance and relevance to a Facebook user. 
Similarly, a photograph may lose relevancy as well. The ability for a Facebook photograph’s 
narrative potential is another demonstration of the Calliope Impulse. Furthermore, the 
interconnected discourse of memory and photography aids “our understanding…[of] how we 
construct our own histories through memory, even how we position ourselves within wider, more 
public histories” (Kuhn 46). One of the ways this more globalized positioning occurs within 
Facebook is through hashtags: #. 
Facebook users have the ability to “hashtag” important information. According to Joanna 
Stern in “#Ready? Clickable Hashtags Are Coming to Your Facebook Newsfeed,” when a 
“hashtag is included in a post, clicking on it will pop out a feed that aggregates other posts that 
have been tagged with the same phrase” (Stern 1). The hashtagging feature has the potential to 
greatly increase the visibility of a particular post or photograph. Of course, the ability to see “the 
larger view of what’s happening or what people are talking about” is still under the control of an 
individual user (Greg Lindley qtd. in Stern 1). The “hashtagged posts will still respect the regular 
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privacy settings” (Stern 1). Even with some users electing to keep their hashtags private or 
confined to their immediate social network, hashtagging reveals how users can insert personal 
experiences into “wider, more public, histories” (Kuhn 46).  
Furthermore, the sensation of hashtagging also develops the perpetually “nesting” 
potential of any given Facebook photograph. Photographs on Facebook have the ability to 
remain perpetually “nesting” because these photographs possess the capacity to evolve over 
time, particularly through the use of hashtagging. The implementation of the shared photo album, 
#throwbackthursday, and #flashbackfriday, are three interconnected occurrences that make 
perpetual reality possible. All three features allow for the uploader and the uploader’s social 
network to revisit past photographic events and reterritorialize the meaning of the photograph.  
The shared photo album feature allows any user the ability to select a photograph and 
repost it through Timeline. This feature facilitates the nostalgic #throwbackthursday and 
#flashbackfriday. Both hashtags allow users to re-engage old pictures—sometimes flattering, 
sometimes humiliating—in order to re-assess the importance and memory of the photographs. 
Kuhn suggests this revisionary process is part of memory-work. She offers “(m)emory, it is 
clear, does not simply involve forgetting, misremembering, repression—that would be to suggest 
there is some fixed ‘truth’ of past events: memory actually is these processes, it is always already 
a secondary revision” (italics in the original 158). The nostalgic hashtags allow a user to 
continuously recreate the past-in-the-present. Older photographs have the ability to become 
constantly revised, becoming either more or less important than they were in their original 
upload. 
One of Facebook’s 2013 developments was the introduction of the shared photo album. 
Debuted in late 2013, this feature allows the primary user to designate other users as co-
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contributors on a specified Facebook album. This inclusive feature reiterates the public nature of 
Facebook photographs and the way in which the memory of an event belongs to a larger, social 
discourse. The networked nature of Facebook photographs and the ability for other users to tag 
or contribute a photograph into another’s profile demonstrates the narrative-bend of the 
Facebook profile. But what happens when a photograph is added that does not properly align 
with the cohesive identity already in place? Users always have the option to either hide the 
photograph from Timeline or untag themselves. If the photograph is offensive, users have the 
option to report the image to Facebook and appeal for removal. These features help police 
identity and are ways of ensuring only the desired self-descriptions are visible. As Riley 
suggests, the selection of self-descriptions is done out of the desire to “show myself truly and to 
make it certain I have been properly read” (51). This act of revision is potentially infinite; 
photographs on Facebook may be violently deleted and removed if the photographs are no longer 
in service of the user’s truth. 
In the twenty-first century, photographs are not passively sitting in a photo album. 
Photographs have evolved into the language of Facebook, an equally valid way to engage the act 
of memory and the process of immortalization. The “selfie” photograph is worth mentioning, 
particularly within the context of immortalization. The “selfie” photograph requires an individual 
to occupy the position of the Photographic Triad.  In this circumstance, the Operator turns the 
camera towards the self. The face of the Operator becomes the Spectrum of the photograph. 
Before the Operator uploads the selfie onto Facebook, the Operator acts as the Spectator, 
inspecting the image, making sure the image captures the correct mood. The advent of selfie 
provides us another opportunity to explore how this split subject allows for the commodification 
of the individual, and through commodification, a glimpse of immortality. 
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CHAPTER 4  WHAT ECHO SAID: ON FACEBOOK PHOTOS AND 
IMMORTALITY 
 
Photography transformed the subject into object, and even, one might say, into a museum 
object. 
—Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida 
 
Make Me Immortal with a Click 
The Facebook profile offers users a way to confront mortality through the inclusion of 
photographs. Barthes indicates that “Death must be somewhere in society…perhaps in an image 
that produces Death while trying to preserve life” (Camera Lucida 92). Following Barthes’ logic, 
a “selfie” photograph forces a confrontation with mortality. This unsettling confrontation with 
death is explored in great depth in Ernest Becker’s book The Denial of Death. Becker claims 
society allows individuals to earn an “immortality project” by “carving out a place in nature, by 
building an edifice that reflects human value” with the “hope and belief…that the things that 
man creates in society…outlive and outshine death and decay” (5). While Becker maintains that 
the immortality project is an unchanging function of human nature, it is worth noting that 
sociohistorical circumstances continuously augment the endeavor of self-presentation. In the 
digital age, the immortality project is directly related to digitization and consumerism.  
The splitting of the subject forces the self to experience itself as other, as object. When 
users log into Facebook, they are confronted with the fragmented nature of the self and given an 
awareness of the constructed nature of identity. But, what happens to the other-self, the one split 
by language? On Facebook, this object-self becomes a commodity. Self-promotion and 
commodification occur on Facebook, but this is less of a fact of cultural narcissism than it is a 
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by-product of a consumer society in late-capitalism. Twenge and Campbel properly assess, but 
fail to properly diagnose the ways in which Facebook users “packag[e] themselves like products 
to be sold” (1). One of the ways to understand the nuances of this is through the idea of the 
“prosumer.” In “The Shift from CONsumers to PROsumers,” Susan Gunelius indicates that  
(i)n the simplest terms, people have moved from being CONsumers to 
PROsumers with far more influence than ever before…The term 
‘prosumer’ has transformed from meaning ‘professional consumer’ to 
meaning ‘product and brand advocate.’ Rather than simply ‘consuming’ 
products, people are becoming voices of those products. (1) 
What is most significant about this shift from consumer to prosumer is that on social media sites 
like Facebook, users brand themselves for public consumption. Gunelius’ article only deals with 
the ways a business can take advantage of this marketing tool, but her theories about the role of 
the prosumer can certainly extend into the ways in which Facebook operates for individuals. 
Gunelius indicates that one of the ways to take advantage of the “social web [is] by creating your 
own branded destinations such as a blog, YouTube channel, Twitter profile, Facebook group or 
fanpage” (2). The idea of the “branded destination” is directly transferable to a user’s profile 
page. The photographs help create what appears as a cohesive identity for an individual.  
 Facebook photographs are traded and exchanged on the social network. For identity on 
Facebook, the currency is not monetary. Instead, we trade for visibility, for recognition, for proof 
of our existence. As visual subjects, we upload photographs as a result of our visual subjectivity. 
We exist through the external gaze of our peers on the social network, but also through our own 
external gaze as split subjects. On Facebook, the economy is steeped in theories of visibility and 
observation, manifesting as the accumulation of likes, comments, and shares. The ability to 
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circulate the self on Facebook means that the self becomes a visual commodity to seek 
preservation from death through the act of commodification.  
 Facebook memorial pages are an excellent avenue to explore the intersection between 
Facebook photographs, visibility, and immortality projects. In “Facebook Rethinks the Fate of 
Your Post After You Die,” Zach Miners offers,  
[w]hen a Facebook user dies, the person’s mourners can ask Facebook to 
memorialize the account. Until now, if an account was memorialized its 
visibility was restricted to friends only…But starting Friday, memorialized 
accounts will be left as they are, so that the posts are visible to whomever 
the user intended. (1) 
This is significant because other users can still interact with the digital identity of the deceased. 
Moreover, the memorialized account becomes something like a museum because these accounts 
“cannot be modified in any way. This includes removing friends, modifying photos or deleting 
any pre-existing content posted by the person” (Facebook Deactivating, Deleting and 
Memorializing Accounts). The Facebook photographs originally uploaded by the deceased 
remain and “depending on the privacy setting of the deceased person’s account, friends can share 
memories on the memorialized Timeline” (Facebook Deactivating, Deleting and Memorializing 
Accounts). On these memorialized accounts, we find that photographs do in fact contain a 
“nesting” memory, capable of being imbued with new significance and new memories as time 
progresses.  
 On Facebook, we find that photographs are constantly returned to the living through the 
use of hashtagging, and sharing. Facebook photographs are the sites of the digital native’s 
immortality project because photographs are a strange act of preservation. In What Do Pictures 
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Want, WJT Mitchell indicates that the “living organism has two logical contraries: the dead 
object (the corpse, mummy, or fossil), which was once alive, and the inanimate object (inert, 
inorganic), which was never alive. The third opposition, then, is the return (or arrival) of life in 
the nonliving substance” (51). Mitchell indicates that this is true of photographs in general. We 
can see the enactment of “the return (or arrival) of life” in the Facebook photograph as well. 
Because the future meaning of a photograph is always “nesting” and memory work is always a 
process of “secondary revision,” I would like to position Facebook’s role as an imagined 
community as one that is tethered to the continuous production of an individual through acts of 
memory and immortalization.   
 
Between the Idea and the Reality 
One of the ways we can understand how Facebook photographs function as part of the 
emerging generation’s desire for an immortality project is through visibility. In “Of Other 
Spaces,” Foucault introduces the idea of the heterotopia: a paradoxical space that is 
simultaneously physical and mental. Foucault explains the intricacies of the real-unreality of 
heterotopia by explaining the spatiality of a mirror, indicating, 
[t]he mirror is, after all, a utopia, since it is a placeless place. In the mirror, 
I see myself there where I am not, in an unreal, virtual space that opens up 
behind the surface; I am over there where I am not, a sort of shadow that 
gives me my own visibility to myself that enables me to see myself where 
I am absent: such is the utopia of the mirror. But it is also a heterotopia as 
the mirror does exist in reality, where it exerts a sort of counteraction on 
the position that I occupy. From the standpoint of the mirror, I discover 
my absence from the place where I am, since I see myself over there…The 
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mirror functions as a heterotopia in this respect: it makes this place that I 
occupy at the moment when I look at myself in the glass at once 
absolutely real, connected with all the space that surrounds it, and 
absolutely unreal, since in order to be perceived it has to pass through this 
virtual point which is over there. (232)  
The space of Facebook, functions in a similar way to the heterotopia of the mirror. We can 
understand Facebook, and the photographs on a user’s profile, as a kind of heterotopic mirror 
whose reflection shapes the user’s understanding of the self.  
 Because a user’s Facebook profile includes photographs from various years and 
potentially various geographies, a profile page becomes a “heterotopia of time.” Foucault 
theorized that the museum exemplified a heterotopia of time because museums spatially confine 
objects from various times and locations in one location. Moreover, objects in a museum exist in 
the same temporality Barthes attributed to photographs: “an illogical conjunction of the here-now 
and the there-then” (“Rhetoric of the Image” 278). Like a photograph, objects in a museum are 
collected in effort of preservation, of actively denying decay: a link between heterotopia and 
photographs.  
Like the museum, the Facebook profile promises to shield the user’s mind, thoughts, and 
appearance from time and death. As an act of memory and memorialization, photographs contain 
a particular power: the dual knowledge of life and death, absence and presence. Photographs 
allow for the Spectrum to endure, to remain fixed in a slice of time. This act of preserving a live 
moment is also an acknowledgement of human mortality because the Spectrum will continue to 
age in physical life. Barthes expressed this dual knowledge as well: “Ultimately, what I’m 
seeking in the photograph taken of me is…Death: Death is the eidos of that photograph” (italics 
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in original Camera Lucida 15). The photographs placed on Facebook also contain this tension 
between life and death, but the death anxiety becomes displaced because of the here-always 
temporality of the Internet. It is because Facebook photographs undergo the third temporality of 
the here-always that a Facebook profile becomes an attempt for immortality.   
 Foucault says, “I see myself there where I am not, in an unreal, virtual space that opens 
up behind the surfaces” (232). This echoes Barthes’ description of the self in the photograph as a 
“cunning dissociation of consciousness when I look at ‘myself’ on a piece of paper” (Camera 
Lucida 12). The connection between the heterotopia of the mirror and the heterotopia of the 
photograph is crucial for my argument because these two points are also related to Lacan’s space 
of the screen. It is in the heterotopia of the mirror, photograph, and Facebook profile when the 
self is visually reminded that the narrative of a singular, cohesive identity is fiction.  
 The self-reflective nature of the Facebook profile may cause the user to understand Walt 
Whitman’s famous line from Song of Myself: “I am large, I contain multitudes” (194). It is this 
uncomfortable moment of the self-as-other that the Facebook photograph occupies. Due to the 
split nature of the subject, the self-presented online does not necessarily have to be congruent 
with physical identity. After all, the cohesive self is not possible. The presentation of identity on 
Facebook is mythic, imbued with constructed cohesion and stability. The very fact that digital 
and physical identities do not have to align confirms our ability to experience “multiple realities” 
that are all equally valid, equally constructed through language (Vitanza 3). One way to 
understand how multiple realities or identities function is noting how an individual can be a 
sibling, a spouse, and a child. These three identities are all different from each other, yet each 
identity exists aside the other. The Facebook self and the physical self are similarly situated 
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realities that can coexist, particularly after the myth of cohesion is dispelled. Again, Whitman 
seems apt, “Do I contradict myself? Very well then I contradict myself” (194).  
The combination of the revisionary act of memory, the (limited) social ownership of 
Facebook photographs, and the implementation of hashtags, signifies that Facebook photographs 
have the potential for continuous interaction long after the death of an individual user. The 
integrity of a user’s identity remains when the user is present or absent. In this way, the 
Facebook photograph embodies Foucault’s observations regarding the desire to create a 
heterotopia is related to the modern desire  
of establishing a sort of general archive, the will to enclose in one place all 
time, all epochs, all forms, all tastes, the idea of constituting a place of all 
times that is itself outside of time and inaccessible to its ravages, the 
project of organizing in this way a sort of perpetual and indefinite 
accumulation of time in an immobile place. (234) 
On Facebook, we create “general archive” for individual identity; through the implementation of 
hashtagging, we have begun to think of ways to insert our personal identities and experiences 
into larger cultural movements. 
 We will perform a great disservice if we believe that Facebook is the only place where 
identity is actively constructed. In reality, Facebook is a symptom of our visual subjectivity and 
our panoptic impulses. Facebook identity construction holds a mirror to the processes and ways 
in which our identities are “warranted” through the exterior forces like ideology, race, 
sociohistorical circumstances, and socioeconomic positions. Facebook identity construction calls 
attention to our fictionalized physical selves. Moreover, Facebook identity construction reveals 
how our very subjectivity is based not on authenticity, but on complex network of visibility and 
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concealment. The presentation of identity on Facebook is not narcissistic, but panoptic. The 
reason we photographically report our accomplishments, our normalcy, to the social network is 
because we have internalized surveillance, internalized the need to be visibly identified as 
operating in certain social bandwidths of acceptability.  
In order to rescue the Facebook self from triviality, we must recognize that the very notion 
of the self requires an externalized gaze, an audience. As split subjects, language forces us to view 
ourselves from a third person perspective. The creation of the subject through external forces is 
part of our contemporary experience. It is this experience of visibility that is enacted and replicated 
on Facebook. The Facebook photograph, more than anything else in our society, clearly shows us 
the way the public gaze impacts the construction of the self. 
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